We present a direct reduction from k-player games to 2-player games that preserves approximate Nash equilibrium. Previously, the computational equivalence of computing approximate Nash equilibrium in k-player and 2-player games was established via an indirect reduction. This included a sequence of works defining the complexity class PPAD, identifying complete problems for this class, showing that computing approximate Nash equilibrium for k-player games is in PPAD, and reducing a PPAD-complete problem to computing approximate Nash equilibrium for 2-player games. Our direct reduction makes no use of the concept of PPAD, thus eliminating some of the difficulties involved in following the known indirect reduction.
Introduction
This manuscript addresses the computation of Nash equilibrium for games represented in normal form. It is known that for 2-player games this problem is PPAD-complete [CD06b] , and for k players it is in PSPACE [EY07] . Moreover, for sufficiently small ǫ, computing ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium for 2-player games remains PPAD-complete [CDT06] , and for k players it is in PPAD [DGP09] . It follows that, for appropriate choices of ǫ, ǫ-well-supported Nash in k-player games reduces to ǫ-well-supported Nash in 2-player games. However, this chain of reductions is indirect, passing through intermediate notions other than games, and also rather complicated.
In this manuscript we present a direct, "game theoretic" polynomial-time reduction from k-player to 2-player games. In our reduction, every pure strategy of each of the k players is represented by a corresponding pure strategy of one of the 2 players. Previously, a direct reduction preserving exact Nash equilibrium was known from k-player to 3-player games [Bub79] . Such a reduction cannot exist to 2-player games due to issues of irrationality [Nas51] , hence the need to consider the notion of ǫ-wellsupported Nash in this context. Our reduction guarantees that for appropriate choices of ǫ 2 and ǫ k , given any ǫ 2 -well-supported Nash for the 2-player game, normalizing its probabilities according to the above correspondence immediately gives an ǫ k -well-supported Nash for the k-player game.
The direct reduction makes no use of the concept of PPAD. This eliminates some of the difficulties involved in following the known indirect reduction. It is inevitable that unlike the indirect reduction, our reduction by itself does not establish the PPAD-completeness of computing (or approximating) Nash equilibria. Nevertheless, the new gadgets we introduce are relevant to the notion of PPAD-completeness, as they can be used in other reductions among PPAD problems. Moreover, our reduction provides an alternative proof to the proof of Daskalakis et al. [DGP09] that finding an approximate Nash equilibrium in k-player games is in PPAD.
Nash Equilibrium, Approximations and Computational Problems A Nash equilibrium is a mixed strategy profile such that the players of the game cannot improve their expected payoffs by deviating from it unilaterally. The supports of a Nash equilibrium contain only pure strategies that are best responses, i.e. maximize the expected payoff given the mixed strategies of the other players. Formally, given a mixed strategy profile p −i , pure strategy j is a best response for player i if u i G [j] = max j ′ ∈[n] {u i G [j ′ ]}. Every game has a Nash equilibrium [Nas51] , but finding such an equilibrium may be difficult. There are games for which every Nash equilibrium contains irrational probabilities, making it hard even to represent. This motivates the consideration of approximate instead of exact Nash equilibrium. In the context of reductions from k-player to 2-player games, there is another motivation for considering approximate Nash equilibrium. Unlike k player games, 2-player games always have a rational Nash equilibrium [Nas51, Pap07] . Thus we do not expect to find a reduction that preserves exact Nash equilibrium, direct or indirect.
There are several possible notions of approximation. We focus on the notion of ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, a mixed strategy profile whose supports contain only ǫ-best responses, i.e. pure strategies that maximize the expected payoff up to an additive factor of ǫ. We will primarily be interested in small, non-constant values of ǫ, namely ǫ = 1/poly(n) and ǫ = 1/ exp(n). A related, computationally equivalent approximation notion is that of ǫ-Nash equilibrium -a mixed strategy profile from which deviating unilaterally cannot improve a player's expected payoff by more than ǫ [DGP09] . For other approximation notions see [EY07] . Definition 1.1 (ǫ k -kNASH and ǫ m -LINEAR-NASH) Given a pair of normal form game G k and accuracy parameter ǫ k , the problem ǫ k -kNASH is to find an ǫ k -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G k . Given a pair of polymatrix game G m and accuracy parameter ǫ m , the problem ǫ m -LINEAR-NASH is to find an ǫ m -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G m .
Our Results
Let (G m 1 , ǫ m 1 ), (G m 2 , ǫ m 2 ) be two pairs of games and accuracy parameters. The games have m 1 , m 2 players respectively; the number of pure strategies of player i is n 1 i , n 2 i respectively. The following definitions are based on the notion of reduction scheme defined by Bubelis [Bub79] . 
] mapping pure strategies of player i to distinct pure strategies of player g(i).
is a mapping from G m 1 to G m 2 , such that for every ǫ m 2 -well-supported Nash equlibrium (q 1 , . . . , q m2 ) of G m 2 , an ǫ m 1 -well-supported Nash equilibrium (p 1 , . . . , p m1 ) of G m 1 can be obtained by renormalizing probabilities as follows:
(where z is a normalization factor). Theorem 1.4 (Main) For every ǫ k < 1, there exists a direct reduction from ǫ k -kNASH to ǫ 2 -2NASH, where ǫ 2 = poly(ǫ k /|G k |). The reduction runs in polynomial time in |G k | and in log(1/ǫ k ).
Corollary 1.5 There is a direct, polynomial time reduction from (1/ exp(n))-kNASH to (1/ exp(n))-2NASH, and from (1/poly(n))-kNASH to (1/poly(n))-2NASH.
Proof of Theorem 1.4: By combining Theorem 3.1 (linearizing reduction) with Theorem 4.1 (reduction from linear to bimatrix games), and plugging in the parameters of Lemma 2.3 (logarithmic-sized linear multiplication gadget).
For simplicitly of presentation we defer the proof of Lemma 2.3 to Section 5, and first prove in Section 2 a slightly weaker version (Lemma 2.2 -polynomial-sized linear multiplication gadget), resulting in a reduction that runs in polynomial time in 1/ǫ k instead of log(1/ǫ k ).
Related Work
Bubelis [Bub79] shows a direct reduction from k-player to 3-player games. This reduction relies heavily on the multiplicative nature of 3-player games. Examples of direct reductions involving 2-player games include symmetrization [GKT50] , and reduction to imitation games [MT09] . We use imitation games in Section 4.
PPAD-completeness results Papadimitriou introduced PPAD in 1991, motivated largely by the challenge of classifying the Nash equilibrium problem [Pap94] . Formally, PPAD is the class of total search problems polynomial-time reducible to the abstract path-following problem END OF THE LINE. Another important PPAD-complete problem is 3D-BROUWER, a discrete version of finding Brouwer fixed-points in a 3-dimensional domain (the same problem in high-dimension is known as nD-BROUWER). The known results can be summarized by the two following chains of reductions, each forming an indirect reduction (according to Definition 1.3 of directness) from k-player games to 2-player games:
•
The reductions in the first chain are by [vdLT82, DGP09] , [Pap94, DGP09] , [CD06b, DGP09] and [DGP09] , respectively. The reductions in the second chain are by [vdLT82, DGP09] , [CD06a] , [CDT06] , [CDT06] , respectively. For an overview of these celebrated results see [Rou10] . In comparison, our reduction can be written as:
• ǫ k -kNASH ≤ ǫ m -LINEAR-NASH ≤ ǫ 2 -2NASH where ǫ k , ǫ m , ǫ 2 can either be all 1/ exp(n) or all 1/poly(n). Note there is gap between the second chain of reductions and our results -the second chain achieves a stronger reduction from 1/ exp(n)-kNASH to 1/poly(n)-2NASH. Achieving a direct version of this result by [CDT06] is an interesting open problem. Note also that our reduction from ǫ m -LINEAR-NASH to ǫ 2 -2NASH is somewhat similar to the reduction from ADDITIVE GRAPHICAL NASH to 1/ exp(n)-2NASH, however our reduction does not require the input game to be bipartite nor does it limit the number of interactions per player.
Another open question is the complexity of ǫ k -kNASH and ǫ 2 -2NASH for constant values of ǫ k , ǫ 2 . As a quasi-polynomial algorithm is known [Alt94, LMM03] , these problems are not believed to be PPADcomplete. The current state-of-the-art is a polynomial-time algorithm for ǫ 2 -2NASH where ǫ 2 ≈ 0.667 [KS10] . For finding ǫ 2 -Nash equilibrium rather than ǫ 2 -well-supported Nash equilibrium, there is an algorithm where ǫ 2 ≈ 0.339 [TS07] (see also [DMP06] , [BBM07] , [TS09] ). On the negative side, several algorithmic techniques have been ruled out [HK09] , [DP09] .
Reductions to 2-player games and linearization The empirical success of the Lemke-Howson algorithm [LH64] for finding Nash equilibrium in 2-player games has motivated research on extending it to a more general class of games. Daskalakis et al. show a general reduction from succinct games to 2-player games, which can be applied to any game in which the expected payoffs can be calculated using only +, * , max [DFP06] . Their reduction goes through the steps of the first chain of reductions above. Govindan and Wilson present a non-polynomial linearizing reduction, which reduces multiplayer games to polymatrix games while preserving approximate Nash equilibrium [GW10] . Their reduction introduces a central coordinator player, who interacts bilaterally with every player while simulating the combined behavior of the other players.
In addition, linearization is also related to Etessami and Yannakakis's formulation of PPAD as the class of fixed-point problems for piecewise-linear functions (computable by +, scale, max) [EY07] .
A Linear Multiplication Gadget
In this section we construct a linear multiplication gadget using standard gadgets as building blocks.
Theorem 2.1 (Linear Multiplication Gadget) There exist constants ǫ 0 < 1, c, d and an increasing polynomial function f such that the following holds. For every ǫ < ǫ 0 , there exists a linear multiplication gadget G * = G * (ǫ) of size O(m · f ( 1 ǫ )), such that in an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, the output of G * equals the product of its m inputs up to an additive error of ±dmǫ c .
We develop two different constructions of G * , with two different sets of parameters ǫ 0 , c, d, f . 
Linear Gadgets
Goldberg and Papadimitriou developed the framework of gadgets [GP06] , carefully-engineered games that simulate arithmetic calculations and are useful in many PPAD-completeness results (see, e.g., [DGP09] ). The players of a gadget game are typically binary, representing numerical values in the range [0, 1].
Definition 2.4 (Binary Player) A binary player P is a player that has exactly two pure strategies 0 and 1. We say P represents the numerical value p ∈ [0, 1] if her mixed strategy is (1 − p, p), i.e. she plays pure strategy 1 with probability p.
Gadget games have three kinds of binary players -one or more input players, 2 one output player, and one or more auxiliary players. The size of a gadget is the number of its auxiliary and output players. The values represented by the input and output players are the input values and output value of the gadget. In every ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium of the gadget game, the output value p is equal to the result of an arithmetic operation on the input values (up to small error). This arithmetic relation between the input and output values is the guarantee of the gadget. To achieve the guarantee, the output player is incentivized to play the appropriate value p, by choosing appropriate payoff values for both the output and auxiliary players. Our reductions require gadgets with linear guarantees, which differ slightly from the graphical and additive-graphical gadgets used in previous works. Several gadgets can be combined into a single game, much like arithmetic gates are combined into a circuit to carry out involved calculations. By setting the output player P of gadget G 1 to be an input player of gadget G 2 , the value p represented by P is shared among the gadgets. We represent a combination of gadgets by a series of calculations on the input and output values. For example, if P ′ is the output player of G 2 representing the value p ′ , then we write the above combination as p ′ = G 2 (p) (where in turn p = G 1 (. . . )). The following fact explains why the same player can be an input player of multiple gadgets, but can only be the output player of a single gadget (as for auxliary players, they are considered part of the inner implementation and are thus never shared among different gadgets). It is a consequence of the gadget determining the payoff matrix of its output player, but not of its input players.
Fact 2.6 (Combining Gadgets) For every game in which no player is the output player of more than one gadget, the guarantees of all gadgets hold simultanuously when the game is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium.
Standard Gadgets
The following gadgets are constructed by Daskalakis et al. [DGP09] . To demonstrate the principle behind their construction, we include here the proof of Lemma 2.7; proofs of Lemma 2.8 and Lemma 2.9 appear in Appendix A for completeness.
Lemma 2.7 (Linear Threshold Gadget) For every rational ζ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a linear gadget G >ζ of size O(1) with input p 1 , such that in an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium the output is 1 if p 1 > ζ + ǫ and 0 if p 1 < ζ − ǫ, and otherwise it may be any value in [0, 1].
Proof: Let P 1 , P be the input and output players of G >ζ representing values p 1 , p, respectively. We set the payoff matrix M P,P 1 to be:
G >ζ has no auxiliary players, and so this concludes the construction. We now show that when G >ζ is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, the guarantee of this gadget holds. Let p 1 = (1 − p 1 , p 1 ) be player P 1 's mixed strategy in the ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium. The expected payoff vector u P of player P is equal to:
If p 1 > ζ + ǫ, the only ǫ-best response for player P is pure strategy 1, so P 's mixed strategy (1 − p, p) in the ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium must be (0, 1) and thus p = 1. Similarly, if p 1 < ζ − ǫ then (1 − p, p) = (1, 0) and thus p = 0. Lemma 2.9 (Linear Scaled-Summation Gadget) For every rational ζ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a linear gadget G +, * ζ of size O(1) with inputs p 1 , . . . , p m , such that in an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium the output is min{ζ(p 1 + · · · + p m ), 1} ± ǫ.
In addition, there exist standard gadgets for multiplication, but these are inherently nonlinear -the constructions are based on expected payoffs being multiplicative functions in players' probabilities (see, e.g., [DGP09] ).
Construction
Here we show the construction of G * that will be used to prove Lemma 2.2. We show a construction for multiplying 2 inputs, and multiplying m inputs can be achieved by connecting m − 1 copies of this construction serially. Let P 1 , P 2 be the input players representing values p 1 , p 2 , and let P be the output player representing value p. Let τ = 3ǫ (for simplicity assume that 1/τ is integer). We first encode every input in unary representation, with precision of up to ±τ . For this we use 2/τ auxiliary players:
The vectors v 1 = (v 1 1 , . . . , v 1 1/τ ) and v 2 = (v 2 1 , . . . , v 2 1/τ ) of values represented by auxiliary players {V 1 i } and {V 2 i } are the unary encodings. The i'th unary bit of p 1 is v 1 i , and it is calculated by the threshold gadget G >ζ (Lemma 2.7) as follows:
Then we perform unary multiplication using the AND gadget G ∧ (Lemma 2.8). The result is a matrix U , which contains
, represented by auxiliary players {U i,j }. The construction is complete by summing up and scaling U 's entries using the scaled-summation gadget G +, * ζ (Lemma 2.9) as follows: p = G +, * τ 2 (u 1,1 , u 1,2 , . . . , u 1/τ,1/τ ). This establishes the relation between the input values p 1 , p 2 and the output value p of G * . Note that the payoffs of all players are determined by the standard gadgets.
Correctness
We prove Lemma 2.2 for the case m = 2. Namely, we show that for every ǫ < 1/4, when G * is in ǫ-wellsupported Nash equilibrium then p = p 1 p 2 ± dǫ, that G * is linear and that the size of G * is O(1/ǫ 2 ). The proof of Lemma 2.2 for general m follows, since concatenating m − 1 copies of G * increases the error and gadget size by a multiplicative factor of m.
Proof of Lemma 2.2 (Polynomial-Sized Construction): First note that G * is a combination of linear gadgets and is thus itself linear. The size of G * is O(1/τ 2 ), the total size of the standard gadgets (2/τ threshold gadgets G >ζ , 1/τ 2 AND gadgets G ∧ , and 1 scaled-summation gadget G +, * ζ , all of size O(1)).
We assume G * is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium where ǫ < 1/4, and write the input values p 1 , p 2 as integer multiples of τ plus a small error: let p 1 = i * τ + δ 1 and p 2 = j * τ + δ 2 , where 0 ≤ i * , j * ≤ 1/τ and 0 ≤ δ 1 , δ 2 < τ . The following claim shows that the coefficients i * , j * are correctly encoded as unary vectors v 1 , v 2 , and is a direct consequence of the threshold gadget's guarantee (Lemma 2.7). The threshold gadget is "brittle" in the sense that for a small range of inputs it returns an arbitrary output, but the choice of τ = 3ǫ ensures this happens for at most one unary bit. Proof: Consider the i'th entry of v 1 . By construction, v 1 i = G >iτ (p 1 ). By Lemma 2.7, v 1 i indicates whether p 1 > iτ + ǫ or p 1 < iτ − ǫ, and otherwise can be any value in [0, 1]. Since τ = 3ǫ we know that p 1 > (i * − 1)τ + ǫ, therefore for every i ≤ i * − 1 entry v 1 i is equal to 1, and in total v 1 ≥ i * − 1. On the other hand we know that p 1 < (i * + 2) − ǫ, therefore for every i ≥ i * + 2 entry v 1 i is equal to 0, and in total v 1 ≤ i * + 1. Moreover, since τ > 2ǫ, there can be at most one value of i for which p 1 = iτ ± ǫ, and so there can be at most one entry i of v 1 which is an arbitrary value ' ?' in [0, 1].
The rest of the proof of Lemma 2.2 is a straightforward corollary of the other gadget guarantees. Let U denote the sum i,j u i,j of matrix U 's entries. By construction, p = G +, * τ 2 (u 1,1 , u 1,2 , . . . , u 1/τ,1/τ ), thus by the guarantee of gadget G +, * ζ (Lemma 2.9), p = τ 2 U ± ǫ. We write the product p 1 p 2 as an integer multiple of τ 2 up to a small error: i * j * τ 2 ≤ p 1 p 2 < i * j * τ 2 + 3τ . The next claim shows that U gives approximately the correct coefficient of τ 2 .
. By Lemma 2.8, if ǫ < 1/4 and v 1 i = v 2 j = 1 then u i,j = 1. By Claim 2.10, there are at least (i * − 1)(j * − 1) pairs i, j such that v 1 i = v 2 j = 1, and so U ≥ (i * − 1)(j * − 1). Similarly, by Lemma 2.8, if ǫ < 1/4 and v 1 i = 0 ∨ v 2 j = 0 then u i,j = 0. By Claim 2.10, there are at most (i * + 1)(j * + 1) pairs i, j such that v 1 i = 0 ∧ v 2 j = 0, and so U ≤ (i * + 1)(j * + 1).
Since i * , j * ≤ 1/τ , it follows from the above claim that U = i * j * ±(2/τ +1). So p = τ 2 i * j * ±(3τ +ǫ) = p 1 p 2 ± (6τ + ǫ) = p 1 p 2 ± dǫ, where d = 19. This concludes the proof of Lemma 2.2, showing that G * outputs the product of its inputs p 1 p 2 up to a small error of ±dǫ.
Example 2.12 Let p 1 = 7τ + ǫ/4 and p 2 = 2τ + (τ − ǫ/8). First we find the unary encoding: v 1 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, ? , 0, . . . , 0) and v 2 = (1, 1, ?, 0, . . . , 0). Then we perform unary multiplication: 
Summing up and scaling the entries of U we get p = 12τ 2 + O(ǫ), which is close to p 1 p 2 up to O(ǫ).
Linearizing Multiplayer Games
In this section we show a direct reduction from k-player games to polymatrix games. Let G k denote the input game to the reduction, and let G m denote the corresponding output game. The reduction relies on the fact that, although G k 's expected payoffs are nonlinear in its players' probabilities, they are linear in products of its players' probabilities. A key component of our reduction is a linear multiplication gadget for computing these products, which exists according to Theorem 2.1. Let f be an increasing polynomial function as in Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 3.1 (A Linearizing Reduction) For every ǫ k < 1, there exists a direct reduction from ǫ k -kNASH to ǫ m -LINEAR-NASH, where ǫ m = poly(ǫ k /|G k |). The reduction runs in polynomial time in
Preserving Expected Payoffs
The following lemma will be useful in desiging the linearizing reduction. Let G k be a game with k players, n pure strategies each. Let G m be a game with m > k players, where the first k players have the same pure strategies as the players of 
Proof: Let j ∈ [n] be a pure strategy in the support of player i (p i j > 0). We know that j is an ǫ m -best response in G m . Assume for contradiction that j is not an ǫ k -best response in G k , i.e. there is a pure strategy 
The Linearizing Reduction
Given an input pair (G k , ǫ k ), we find an output pair (G m , ǫ m ) as follows. Let ǫ 0 < 1, c, d be the constant parameters of Theorem 2.1. Then ǫ m = min{(ǫ k /3n k−1 dk) 1/c , ǫ 0 }. The players of G m are:
• Original players -the first k players of G m have the same pure strategies as G k 's players. p i denotes the mixed strategy of original player i.
• Mediator players -for every i ∈ [k], there is a set of n k−1 binary players that corresponds to the set of n k−1 pure strategy profiles of all original players except i. We denote by Q s −i the mediator player corresponding to pure strategy profile s −i and by q s −i the represented value.
• Gadget players -all auxiliary players belonging to kn k−1 copies of the linear multiplication gadget G * .
Every mediator player is set to be the output player of a gadget G * as follows:
, . . . , p k
). Thus, q s −i will be approximately equal to the probability with which the original players play the pure strategy profile s −i . Let q i be the vector of values {q s −i }, then it's approximately equal top −i , the joint mixed strategy distribution of all original players except i.
To complete the description of G m it remains to specify the non-zero payoff matrices of the original players (all other payoffs are determined by the gadgets). In G k , the expected payoff vector of player i is u i
In G m , the payoff of original player i will be influenced only by the i'th set of mediator players {Q s −i } who play q i . Instead of describing every payoff matrix M i,Q s −i separately, (such a description appears in the proof of Lemma 3.2), we describe one large payoff matrix M i Gm that contains all the others (or more precisely, all their nonzero columns) as submatrices. We want the expected payoffs in G m to be as close as possible to those of G k . Thus, we set
. This concludes the contruction.
Correctness
Proof of Theorem 3.1 (A Linearizing Reduction): The reduction runs in time polynomial in |G k | = Θ(kn k ) and in f (1/ǫ k ): The running time depends on the size of the polymatrix game G m , which is polynomial in the number of its players. There are k original players, kn k−1 mediator players and kn k−1 O(|G * |) auxiliary players. By Theorem 2.1,
Since f is a polynomial function and ǫ m = poly(ǫ k /|G k |), the total number of players is indeed polynomial in |G k | and in
Proof of Lemma 3.2 (Recovering ǫ k -Well-supported Nash after Linearization): Let (p 1 , . . . , p m ) be an ǫ m -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G m . We show that the first k mixed strategies of (p 1 , . . . , p m ) form an ǫ k -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G k . We would like to upper bound the entry-wise distance between the payoff vectors u i Gm , u i G k so that we can apply Lemma 3.3. The proof proceeds as follows: We show that the expected payoff vector of original , . . . , p k
). By Theorem 2.1 and since ǫ m < ǫ 0 , the gadget G * guarantees that q
c . By definition ofp −i as the joint mixed strategy distribution of all players except i we get that q
Using the fact that the entries of
are all in the range [0, 1], and that the dimensions of the matrices are n × n k−1 , we conclude that
We can now apply Lemma 3.3 with δ = n k−1 dk(ǫ m ) c . So (p 1 , . . . , p k ) is a (2δ + ǫ m )-well-supported Nash equilibrium of G k , and plugging in the chosen value of ǫ m gives ǫ k -well-supported Nash equilibrium, as required.
Reducing Linear Games to Bimatrix Games
In this section we show how to replace the multiple players of a polymatrix game by two representative "super-players" of a bimatrix game. Let G m denote the input game to the reduction, and let G 2 denote the corresponding output game. Lemma 4.2 (Recovering ǫ m -Well-Supported Nash) For every ǫ 2 -well-supported Nash equilibrium (x, y) of G 2 , partitioning y into subvectors y 1 , . . . , y m of lengths n 1 , . . . , n m and normalizing gives an ǫ m -well-supported Nash equilibrium (y 1 / y 1 , . . . , y m / y m ) of G m .
Imitation Games and Block ǫ-Uniform Games
The following definitions and lemmas will be useful in proving Theorem 4.1. An imitation game is a bimatrix game in which both players have N pure strategies, and the payoff matrix of player 2 is equal to the N × N identity matrix I N . We call player 1 the leader and player 2 the imitator. A similar lemma to the following was proved in [MT09] for the case of exact Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 4.3 (Imitation) Let (x, y) be an ǫ 2 -well-supported Nash equilibrium of an imitation game G 2 where ǫ 2 ≤ 1/N . Then support(y) ⊆ support(x).
Proof: Assume pure strategy j is not in support(x), i.e. x j = 0. The expected payoff vector of the imitator is u 2 G2 = I N x = x, and so for pure strategy j the expected payoff is x j = 0. Since x is a probability distribution vector with N entries of which one is assumed to be zero, there exists a pure strategy j ′ = j for which the imitator's expected payoff is u 2
The difference between the expected payoffs is more than ǫ, so j cannot be an ǫ-best response for the imitator and so does not belong to support(y). We conclude that support(y) ⊆ support(x), as required.
We call a bimatrix game block ǫ-uniform if player 1's payoff matrix A is of the following form:
• Block matrix: A is composed of m 2 blocks, where block (i, i ′ ), denoted A i,i ′ , is of size n i × n i ′ ;
• Very negative diagonal: The i'th diagonal block A i,i is equal to −αE n i , where α = 8m 2 /ǫ and E n i is the all-ones matrix of size n i × n i ; For a similar construction see the generalized Matching Pennies game of [GP06] . If x, y is a mixed strategy profile of an ǫ-block-uniform game, we denote by x 1 , . . . , x m and y 1 , . . . , y m the mixed strategy blocks of size n 1 , . . . , n m . We say that block i belongs to the support of mixed strategy x if there is some pure strategy in block i that belongs to this support. The following lemma shows that in a block ǫ-uniform game, the weight of player 2 is ǫ-uniformly divided among all blocks i in support(x). . Assume for contradiction that y i > y i ′ + (1 + ǫ 2 )/α. Then the expected payoff for playing a pure strategy in block i is at most −α( y i ′ + (1 + ǫ 2 )/α) + 1, while the expected payoff for playing in block i ′ is at least −α( y i ′ ). The difference is more than ǫ 2 , contradicting the assumption that i belongs to support(x).
If a game is both imitation and block ǫ-uniform, then the weight of player 2 is divided ǫ-uniformly among all blocks in [m].
Corollary 4.5 (Imitation and Block ǫ-Uniform) Let x, y be an ǫ 2 -well-supported Nash equilibrium of a block ǫ 2 -uniform imitation game G 2 , where ǫ 2 ≤ 1/N . Then for every two blocks i, i ′ ∈ [m], 
The Reduction
Given an input pair (G m , ǫ m ), we show how to find an output pair (G 2 , ǫ 2 ), where G 2 has payoffs in the range [−α, 1]. To complete the reduction, G 2 can then be normalized by adding α to all payoffs and scaling by 1/(α + 1) (ǫ 2 is also scaled). Let N = m i=1 n i be the total number of pure strategies in G m . Let ǫ 2 = ǫ m /N . The pure strategies of every player in G 2 are the set [N ] . The payoffs are chosen such that G 2 is both an imitation game and a block ǫ 2 -uniform game:
where M i,i ′ is the payoff matrix of player i for interacting with player i ′ in G m .
Correctness
Proof of Proof of Lemma 4.2 (Recovering ǫ m -Well-supported Nash from Bimatrix Game): Let (x, y) be an ǫ 2 -well-supported Nash equilibrium played in G 2 , and let (y 1 / y 1 , . . . , y m / y m ) be a mixed strategy profile played in G m . We show that this mixed strategy profile is actually an ǫ m -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G m .
For every player i of G m , we define an injective function h i :
So h i maps the j'th pure strategy of player i in G m to the j'th pure strategy in block i of player 1 in G 2 . We now show that player i's expected payoff for playing j in G m is closely related to player 1's expected payoff for playing h i (j) in G 2 , assuming strategy profiles (x, y) and (y 1 / y 1 , . . . , y m / y m ) are being played in G 2 and G m , respectively. In fact, the expected payoffs are the same up to shifting by α y i (the contribution from the diagonal of player 1's payoff matrix A), scaling by m (the number of blocks on which y is uniformly distributed), and small additive errors. As in Section 3, the fact that the expected payoffs are preserved, even up to shift and scale, is enough for one game's ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium to imply the other's. 
Proof: By construction of matrix A, player 1's expected payoff vector for playing pure strategies in block i is A i,i y i + i ′ =i M i,i ′ y i ′ . The entries of vector A i,i y i are −α y i , and the sum
Gm . By Corollary 4.5, and since (x, y) in an ǫ 2 -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G 2 , player 2's weight is distributed evenly over the m blocks up to (1 + ǫ 2 )/α. It is not hard to see that Corollary 4.5 implies, for every i ′ ∈ [m], that y i ′ = 1/m±(1+ǫ 2 )/α. Plugging in, we get that entry h i (j) in player 1's expected payoff vector is
. The proof is complete by noting that player i's expected payoff u i Gm [j] in G m is bounded by m, and by rearranging.
It's left to show that preservation of expected payoffs for playing h i (j) and j up to shift and scale is enough to ensure that (y 1 / y 1 , . . . , y m / y m ) is an ǫ m -well-supported Nash equilibrium of G
By choice of ǫ 2 and α, ǫ 2 ≤ ǫ m /m − 2m(1 + ǫ 2 )/α. Thus, h i (j) cannot be an ǫ 2 -best response for player 1 in G 2 , contradiction. This completes the proof of Lemma 4.2.
A Logarithmic-Sized Linear Multiplication Gadget
In this section we prove Lemma 2.3 by showing an alternative contruction of a linear multiplication gadget. The main difference from the construction shown in Section 2 is that the unary encoding is replaced by binary encoding. However, this introduces a new difficulty, since every gadget that performs binary bit extraction is inherently brittle, i.e., its output is arbitrary for certain inputs. We use the bit extraction gadget of [DGP09] , and overcome the brittleness using standard methods of averaging (somewhat simplified by introducing a new median gadget).
Linear Gadgets
We introduce several linear gadgets that will be useful for the construction. Additional gadgets that are known from previous works can be found in Appendix A. Throughout, we denote the input, output and auxiliary players of a gadget by P 1 , . . . , P m , P, W, W 1 , . . . , W l , and the values they represent by p 1 , . . . , p m , p, w, w 1 , . . . , w l .
The following gadget G mask treats its first input as a binary mask for its second input (i.e., performs multiplication between a binary input and an arbitrary input while maintaining linearity). Furthermore, it guarantees that if the second input is close to zero, the output will be close to zero as well.
Lemma 5.1 (Linear Mask Gadget) There exists a linear gadget G mask such that in every ǫ-wellsupported Nash equilibrium:
Proof: Nonzero payoff matrices:
Expected payoff vectors:
Assume G mask is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium. First we show that p 1 is a binary mask for p 2 . If p 1 = 0, the only ǫ-best response for player W is 0, and so w = 0 and also p = 0 (actually this holds whenever p 1 < 1/2). If p 1 = 1, player W 's expected payoffs for playing strategies 0 and 1 are p and p 2 respectively. We claim that p must be equal to p 2 up to ±ǫ. Indeed, if p > p 2 + ǫ, w = 0 and so p = 0, contradiction. Similarly, if p < p 2 − ǫ, w = 1 and so p = 1, contradiction.
It is left to show that if p 2 is close to zero then p is also close to zero. Assume for contradiction that p 2 ≤ 2ǫ and p > 3ǫ. Pure strategy 1 must be an ǫ-best response for P , therefore w ≥ (1 − w) − ǫ. So pure strategy 1 must be an ǫ-best response for W , therefore
Lemma 5.2 (Linear Max Gadget) There exists a linear gadget G max such that in every ǫ-wellsupported Nash equilibrium, p = max{p 1 , p 2 } ± 4ǫ.
Proof: The construction is by combining gadgets:
The correctness follows almost immediately from the guarantees of the combined gadgets (see Lemma 2.9, Lemma 5.1, Lemma A.1, Lemma A.2). The idea is to set the output p to be approximately equal to w 1 (p 2 − p 1 ) + p 1 , where w 1 is an indicator whether p 1 < p 2 . Assume G max is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium. If p 1 < p 2 − ǫ then w 1 = 1, and so p is approximately equal to p 2 . Similarly, if p 1 > p 2 + ǫ then w 1 = 0, and so p is approximately equal to p 1 . In the case that |p 2 − p 1 | ≤ ǫ, w 1 may receive any arbitrary value, but w 2 ≤ 2ǫ and so by the guarantee of G mask , w 3 ≤ 3ǫ. The product w 1 (p 2 − p 1 ) is calculated by G mask in order to maintain the linearity of the construction.
Lemma 5.3 (Linear Min Gadget) There exists a linear gadget G min such that in every ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, p = min{p 1 , p 2 } ± 8ǫ.
The correctness follows immediately by the guarantees of the combined gadgets (see Lemma 5.2, Lemma A.3).
Lemma 5.4 (Linear Median Gadget) There exists a linear gadget G median such that in every ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, p = median{p 1 , p 2 , p 3 } ± 20ǫ.
Assume G median is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium. We use the following notation to prove correctness: s = min {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 }, m = median {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 } and l = max {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 }, such that s ≤ m ≤ l. The values w 2 and w 3 are equal to two of the three values {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 } = {s, m, l}, up to an error of ±12ǫ introduced by the maximum and minimum gadgets. To see this, notice that if w 1 = p i∈{1,2} ± 4ǫ, then w 2 = p j∈{1,2},j =i ±4ǫ and w 3 = min {p 3 , p i ± 4ǫ}±8ǫ (by Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.3). Now, if m < l−4ǫ, both w 2 and w 3 must be strictly smaller than l, so the two values they are approximately equal to must be s and m. Taking their maximum therefore results in the median value: max {w 2 , w 3 } = m ± 12ǫ, and so p = m ± (12ǫ + 4ǫ) (Lemma 5.2). If, however, m ≥ l − 4ǫ, then w 2 and w 3 are approximately equal to either {s, m}, {s, l} or {m, l}. Taking the maximum of {w 2 , w 3 } therefore results in either m ± (12ǫ + 4ǫ) or l ± (12ǫ + 4ǫ) = m ± 20ǫ.
Brittle Construction
We first construct a brittle multiplication gadget denoted byG * . Let β = 1 2 log(1/ǫ) be a parameter of the construction (assume for simplicity that β is integral). The output p ofG * is guaranteed to be p 1 p 2 ± O( √ ǫ), but only as long as the input p 1 is far enough from any integer multiple of 2 −β . For every 1 ≤ i ≤ β, let B i , S i , W i be auxiliary players representing values b i , s i , w i respectively.G * sets b 1 , . . . , b β to be the β most significant bits of input p 1 using the bit-extraction gadget G bit (Lemma A.6). Then,G * calculates p 2 β i=1 b i 2 −i , which equals p 2 p 1 ± 2 −β . The calculations are carried out in the following order:
• The values p 2 2 −i i∈ [β] are calculated using the scaling gadget G * ζ (Lemma A.5), i.e., s i = G * 2 −i (p 2 ).
• For every i ∈ [β], p 2 2 −i is multiplied by the extracted bit b i using the mask gadget G mask (Lemma 5.1), i.e., w i = G mask (b i , s i ).
• The values {p 2 2 −i b i } i∈ [β] are summed up using the summation gadget G + = G +, * 1 (Lemma 2.9), i.e., p = G + (w 1 , . . . , w β ).
Correctness of Brittle Construction
Lemma 5.5 Let p 1 , p 2 be the input values ofG * . If p 1 is 3βǫ-far from every integer multiple of 2 −β , then in every ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium where ǫ ≤ 1 10 3 , the output value p equals p 1 p 2 ± 2 √ ǫ.
The size ofG * is O(β).
Proof: First observe that since β = 1 2 log(1/ǫ) (i.e., 2 −β = √ ǫ) and ǫ ≤ 1 10 3 , it holds that 2 · 3βǫ < 2 −β , and so p 1 can indeed be 3βǫ-far from any integer multiple of 2 −β . We write p 1 as p 1 = β i=1 b * i 2 −i + δ, where 3βǫ < δ < 2 −β − 3βǫ. AssumeG * is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium where ǫ ≤ 1 10 3 . By Lemma 5.1, Lemma A.6 and Lemma A.5, we know that for every i ∈ [β]:
By Lemma 2.9 and the value of δ:
Plugging in β = 1 2 log(1/ǫ), we get that p = p 1 p 2 ± 2 √ ǫ, as required. Size ofG * : The bit-extraction gadget G bit requires O(β) vertices (Lemma A.6), and the number of auxiliary vertices {S i } and {W i } is also O(β). The other gadgets are of constant size.
Robust Construction
When p 1 is close to a multiple of 2 −β ,G * 's output may be arbitrary. To circumvent this issue, the ultimate multiplication gadget G * appliesG * three times, each time with a slightly perturbed copy of the input p 1 . The perturbation guarantees that at most one of the three copies of p 1 is close to an integer multiple of 2 −β , so that at least two ofG * 's three outputs are approximately correct. The difficulty is that we don't know which of the three outputs is approximately correct and which is arbitrary. We overcome this difficulty by taking the median of the three outputs as the final result, which is now guaranteed to be approximately equal to the required output p 1 p 2 .
The inputs toG * are set to be (up to ±O(ǫ)): (p 1 , p 2 ), (p 1 − ∆, p 2 ) and (p 1 − 2∆, p 2 ), wherep 1 = max{p 1 , 2∆} and ∆ = 7βǫ. This is achieved by combining the following gadgets:
• First, the value ofp 1 is set: c 1 = G := (2∆ + 7ǫ),p 1 = G max (p 1 , c 1 ).
• Then, two additional inputs are prepared:
• The median is found: p = G median (w 1 , w 2 , w 3 ). Proof: Since the distance ∆±4ǫ is larger than 2·3βǫ, if one ofp 1 , d 1 , d 2 is 3βǫ-close to a certain multiple k2 −β , then the other two must be 3βǫ-far from k2 −β . Furthermore, since the distance is smaller than (2 −β − 2 · 3βǫ)/2, the other two must be 3βǫ-far from the nearby multiples (k − 1) 2 −β and (k + 1) 2 −β as well.
Correctness of Robust Construction
By Lemma 5.5 and Claim 5.6, at most one of w 1 , w 2 , w 3 can be arbitrary. There are two cases:
• The median is not the arbitrary value. Assume without loss of generality that the median is w 3 (since it is the furthest fromp 1 p 2 ). By Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 5.5:
• The median is the arbitrary value. Assume without loss of generality that the non-arbitrary values are w 2 and w 3 (the furthest fromp 1 p 2 ). The median is between these values, so we may assume without loss of generality that it is equal to w 3 , and proceed as in the previous case. We have seen that in both cases, p is close top 1 p 2 . It is now left to verify thatp 1 is close to p 1 .
Claim 5.7p 1 = p 1 ± (2∆ + 11ǫ).
We conclude that p = p 1 p 2 ± (2 √ ǫ + 4∆ + 37ǫ) = p 1 p 2 ± 3 √ ǫ, as required.
A Standard Gadgets
The following gadgets are constructed by Daskalakis et al. [DGP09] . We denote the input and output players by P 1 , P 2 , P , and the values they represent by p 1 , p 2 , p.
Proof of Lemma 2.8 (Linear AND Gadget):
Nonzero payoff matrices:
Assume G >ζ is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium where ǫ < 1/4. If p 1 = p 2 = 1, the only ǫ-best response for player P is pure strategy 1, so p = 1. Similarly, if (p 1 = 0) ∨ (p 2 = 0) then p = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.9 (Linear Scaled-Summation Gadget):
Let P 1 , . . . , P m , P, W be the input players, output player and auxiliary player of G +, * ζ respectively, representing values p 1 , . . . , p m , p, w. Nonzero payoff matrices:
Assume G +, * ζ is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium. If player W plays full support (0 < w < 1), then both of W 's pure strategies 0 and 1 must be ǫ-best responses, and so • u P = M P,P 1 p 1 + M P,P 2 p 2 = (p 1 , p 2 ).
Assume G < is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium. If p 1 < p 2 − ǫ, the only ǫ-best response for player P is pure strategy 1, so p = 1. Similarly, if p 1 > p 2 + ǫ then p = 0.
Lemma A.2 (Linear Minus Gadget) There exists a linear subtraction gadget G − of size O(1), such that in every ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, p = max {0, p 2 − p 1 } ± ǫ.
Proof: Nonzero payoff matrices: • u W = M W,P p P + M W,P 1 p 1 + M W,P 2 p 2 = (p, p 2 − p 1 );
• u P = M P,W p W = (1 − w, w).
Assume G − is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium. As in the proof of Lemma 2.9, it is not hard to show that either player W plays full support (so both of W 's pure strategies must be ǫ-best responses and p = p 2 − p 1 ± ǫ), or one of the following happens:
• p 2 − p 1 > 1 − ǫ: Player W can play pure strategy 1, and then p = 1 = p 2 − p 1 ± ǫ, as required.
• p 2 − p 1 < ǫ: Player W can play pure strategy 0, and then p = 0 = max{0, p 2 − p 1 } ± ǫ, as required. • u W = M W,P p P + M W,P 1 p 1 = (p, 1 − p 1 );
Assume G 1−x is in ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium. As in the proof of Lemma 2.9, it is not hard to show that either player W plays full support (so both of W 's pure strategies must be ǫ-best responses and p = 1 − p 1 ± ǫ), or one of the following happens:
• 1 − p 1 > 1 − ǫ: Player W can play pure strategy 1, and then p = 1 = 1 − p 1 ± ǫ, as required.
• 1 − p 1 < ǫ: Player W can play pure strategy 0, and then p = 0 = 1 − p 1 ± ǫ, as required. • u W = M W,P p P = (p, ζ);
Proof of correctness as in Lemma A.3.
Lemma A.5 (Linear Scaling Gadget) For every rational ζ ∈ [0, 1], there exists a linear scaling gadget G * ζ of size O(1), such that in every ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium, p = ζp 1 ± ǫ.
Proof: Nonzero payoff matrices: • u W = M W,P p P + M W,P 1 p 1 = (p, ζp 1 );
The following gadget has multiple output players, denoted by B 1 , . . . , B β and representing values b 1 , . . . , b β . It extracts the first β bits of its input, provided the distance of p 1 from any multiple of 2 −β is at least 3βǫ. Proof: The construction is by combining linear gadgets:
The correctness follows from the guarantees of the combined gadgets, and by induction on i. See [DGP09, Lemma 19] for details.
